Cullis and Jones do not advocate for anarchy. They argue that if we are to use government to fix market failure, we must design institutions that constrain the "Leviathan" of the state—constitutional rules, balanced budget amendments, and competitive federalism.

Public choice is a subfield of economics that applies the tools of microeconomics to the study of government decision-making. It involves the analysis of the behavior of politicians, bureaucrats, and voters, and how they make decisions that affect public policy. Public choice theory posits that individuals, including politicians and bureaucrats, act in their own self-interest, and that this self-interest influences their decisions.

This textbook bridges two often-separate fields: traditional public finance (taxation, government expenditure, market failure) and public choice theory (the application of economic reasoning to political decision-making). Unlike many public finance texts that treat government as a benevolent planner, Cullis and Jones consistently ask: What happens when politicians, bureaucrats, and voters act in their own self-interest?

Cullis and Jones, writing in the tradition of James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (the founders of Public Choice theory), flipped this script. Their book is built on a single, provocative question:

The idea that political parties gravitate toward the preferences of the middle-of-the-road voter to win elections.

How the timing of elections influences fiscal policy and spending spikes.

– Chapters on voting mechanisms, rent-seeking, and political business cycles are not afterthoughts. They are woven into standard topics like public goods, externalities, and social insurance.